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ABSTRACT
WELFARE-BASED EVALUATION OF
ALTERNATIVE LOSS FUNCTIONS FOR SMALL
OPEN ECONOMIES
O¨ZHAN, GALI˙P KEMAL
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Refet S. Gu¨rkaynak
July 2009
This master’s thesis compares outcomes of alternative loss functions to op-
timal monetary policy in small open economies as the degree of openness
increases. The small open economy model that is laid out by Gali and Mona-
celli (2005) is taken as the baseline framework. Based on a second order
Taylor approximation to the utility function, the optimal monetary policy is
derived. Then, using the optimal policy as a benchmark, four alternative loss
functions are evaluated. Among others, minimizing the variance of domes-
tic inflation achieves the minimum loss and is equivalent to optimal policy.
Minimization of CPI inflation variance gives higher losses compared to min-
imization of domestic inflation variance. Lastly, attributing positive weight
to dampening exchange rate fluctuations increases welfare losses.
Keywords: Loss function, small open economy, welfare evaluation, optimal
monetary policy.
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O¨ZET
KU¨C¸U¨K AC¸IK EKONOMI˙LERDE REFAH
DEG˘ERLENDI˙RMESI˙NE GO¨RE ALTERNATI˙F
KAYIP FONKSI˙YONLARI
O¨ZHAN, GALI˙P KEMAL
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yard. Doc¸. Dr. Refet S. Gu¨rkaynak
Temmuz 2009
Bu master tezi ku¨c¸u¨k ac¸ık ekonomilerdeki kayıp fonksiyonlarını optimal
para politikasına go¨re ekonomideki ac¸ıklık artarken kars¸ılas¸tırmaktadır. Gali
Monacelli (2005) makalesinde sunulan ku¨c¸u¨k ac¸ık ekonomi modeli temel olarak
alınmıs¸tır. Fayda fonksiyonuna ikinci dereceden Taylor yakınlas¸tırması yapi-
larak optimal para politikası kuralı bulunmus¸tur. Daha sonra, optimal para
politikasına go¨re do¨rt farklı alternatif kayıp fonksiyonu deg˘erlendirilmis¸tir.
Dig˘er kayıp fonksiyonlarına nazaran yerli malı enflasyonundaki sapmayı min-
imize eden kayıp fonksiyonu optimal para politikasıyla c¸akıs¸arak minimum
kaybı vermis¸tir. Tu¨ketici enflasyonundaki sapmayı minimize eden refah kaybı
fonksiyonu ise yerli malı enflasyonunundaki sapmayı minimize eden kayıp
fonksiyonundan daha fazla refah kaybına yol ac¸mıs¸tır. Son olarak, do¨viz kuru
dalgalanmasındaki sapmayı azaltmaya yo¨nelik atılan pozitif ag˘ırlıgın her za-
man refah kaybını arttırdıg˘ı go¨ru¨lmu¨s¸tu¨r.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ku¨c¸u¨k ac¸ık ekonomi, refah deg˘erlendirmesi, kayıp fonksiy-
onu, optimal para politikası.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade optimal monetary policy in open economy general equi-
librium models that feature imperfect competition and nominal rigidities has
become a popular area of research. As pointed out by Bernanke (2007), as
economies become more open and integrated with the world, prices and wages
begin to depend on foreign economic conditions as well as domestic activi-
ties, and this linkage may cause globalization, and therefore trade, to affect
domestic inflation.
“There is a fair amount of consensus in the academic literature that a
desirable monetary policy is the one that achieves a low expected value of a
discounted-loss function, where the losses each period are a weighted average
of terms quadratic in the deviation of inflation from a target rate and in
some measure of output relative to potential” (Woodford, 2003, p. 381).
Determination of inflation and output gap in open economies will differ from
that of closed economies, leading to different welfare losses from the same
policies. In this master’s thesis, we pose the following question as our main
concern: which alternative loss function can give us the closest loss that
is obtained from the fully optimal rule while the degree of openness in the
economy is increasing? In order to answer this question we use the small
open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model that is laid out in Gali
1
and Monacelli (2005) (henceforth GM).
Openness in this framework represents the import-export activity of the
economy being modeled. Figure 1 and Figure 2 report the ratio of import and
export activity to the GDP for Turkey and the US. The increase in openness
shown in these figures verify our concern about taking degree of openness into
account.
This kind of framework was previously used by others. Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1999) studied the optimal monetary policy in a model with one-period
sticky wages. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) (henceforth CGG (2001))
presented the optimal monetary policy under commitment and discretion.
Benigno and Benigno (2003) analyzed the conditions when price stability
rises as an equilibrium outcome. Sutherland (2005) analyzed the implications
of cost-push shocks, and Zaniboni (2008) studied the dynamics assuming
pricing-to-market by firms in this framework.1
Following the previous literature, with the assumptions of complete finan-
cial markets and price stickiness with a specific type of functional form, we
are able to solve the dynamics of the system. After finding the New Keyne-
sian Phillips Curve and the dynamic IS equation, we derive a second order
Taylor approximation to the utility function of the home country’s household
to find the welfare loss function in order to specify our criteria in comparing
the alternative policies.
Then, we write four ad-hoc but reasonable and simple alternative loss
functions for the monetary authority in case they are not able to follow (or
announce) the complicated optimal monetary policy, which is common for
central banks. The dynamics of the four alternatives are compared after a
technology shock, and losses obtained from our welfare criterion are discussed
while the degree of openness in the economy is increasing.
The dynamics of the alternative that considers only minimizing the vari-
1Among many others, other examples of this literature include Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002), and Smets and Wouters (2003).
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ance of inflation on domestically produced goods, namely domestic inflation,
coincides with optimal monetary policy. Under the assumption of complete
markets, a similar result is obtained by Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri
(2007) concerning oil price shocks: higher oil prices does not affect the rela-
tive wealth of an oil-importing country. It can be interpreted that under the
complete markets assumption, if authorities are concerned with only domes-
tic activities, shocks on production influence the dynamics as it does in the
closed economy case. Also, this result justifies the view presented by Don-
ald Kohn: independent central banks control their own destinies, although
openness affects the parameters of central bank models. In addition, Ferrero,
Gertler and Svensson (2008) found that, under an incomplete market assump-
tion, monetary policy regime under current account adjustment scenarios has
important consequences for the behavior of domestic variables, but much less
for international variables. Their main finding is that the central bank should
focus on targeting domestic inflation.
Among the other three alternative loss functions, we see that the aim of
output stabilization next to CPI inflation targeting increases the welfare com-
pared to only CPI inflation targeting. Finally, putting weight on dampening
nominal exchange rate variance in the policy of the monetary authority leads
to higher welfare losses for each degree of openness level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the
small open economy model that is introduced by GM, Section 3 analyzes
the optimal monetary policy, derives welfare loss function of the household,
introduces alternative policies for the optimal monetary policy and discusses
the dynamics and comparisons of the alternatives, and Section 4 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY MODEL
2.1 Households
The model represented here is the standard model that is used in the New
Keynesian Open Economy framework which is consisted of a continuum of
small open economies represented by the unit interval, and where economies
do not have any strategic behavior. Variables without an i index refer to the
small open economy being modeled. Variable with i ∈ [0, 1] subscript refer
to economy i, and variables with star superscript correspond to the world
economy as a whole. The composite consumption index is defined by:
Ct =
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(2.1)
Consumption of domestic goods, CH,t, and consumption of foreign goods,
CF,t are given in Dixit-Stiglitz form:
CH,t =
( 1∫
0
CH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.2)
CF,t =
( 1∫
0
(Ci,t)
γ−1
γ di
) γ
γ−1
(2.3)
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Here, Ci,t refers to consumption of goods imported from country i, and is
given by:
Ci,t =
( 1∫
0
Ci,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.4)
And, ε is the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods pro-
duced within any country, η is the elasticity of substitution between domes-
tic and foreign goods, and γ is the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced in different foreign countries. Parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents the
openness of the economy as the share of the consumption of goods imported
from abroad, and it is the share of the imported goods in the CPI consump-
tion. In other words, the parameter α defines the import-export activity in
the model. With this definition, α is inversely related to the degree of home
bias in preferences, as in Sutherland (2005). Representative household seeks
to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) (2.5)
s.to
1∫
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj +
1∫
0
1∫
0
Pi,tCi,t(j)djdi+Et{Qt,t+1Bt+1} ≤ Bt +WtNt + Tt
(2.6)
where
U(Ct, Nt) =
(Ct)
1−σ
1− σ −
(Nt)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
(2.7)
Notation is as follows: Bt is the quantity of one-period nominally riskless
discount bonds purchased in t, maturing in t + 1; Qt,t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor for one period ahead nominal payoffs; Pi,t(j) is the price of
the good j imported from country i, expressed in domestic currency; Wt is
the nominal wage; Tt expresses the lump-sum taxes; and lastly, Nt is the labor
supply. All variables are expressed in domestic currency and households have
access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded internationally.
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Household’s allocation on its domestic consumption expenditures among
differentiated goods (resulting from cost minimization) will be in the form:
CH,t
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
= CH,t(j) (2.8)
Ci,t
(
Pi,t(j)
Pi,t
)−ε
= Ci,t(j) (2.9)
where PH,t = (
1∫
0
PH,t(j)
1−εdj)
1
1−ε is the index of domestically produced goods,
namely domestic price index, and Pi,t = (
1∫
0
Pi,t(j)
1−εdj)
1
1−ε is the price index
of imported goods from country i in domestic currency. Furthermore, the
price index for all imported goods in domestic currency will be denoted as
PF,t = (
1∫
0
P 1−γi,t di)
1
1−γ . It is convenient to note that
1∫
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj =
PH,tCH,t and
1∫
0
Pi,t(j)Ci,t(j)dj = Pi,tCi,t.
Optimal consumption allocation between the domestic and foreign goods
implies:
CH,t
CF,t
=
(
1− α
α
)(
PH,t
PF,t
)−η
(2.10)
in this case, the consumer price index (CPI) is
Pt =
[
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η
] 1
(1−η)
. (2.11)
Price indexes for domestic and foreign goods are equal in steady state
(PF = PH), and C = C
∗ = Y = Y ∗. Then α corresponds to the share of
domestic consumption allocated to imported goods, and combining (2.1) and
(2.10) yields α = CF
Y
. Since PH,tCH,t +PF,tCF,t = PtCt, optimality conditions
will be:
Nϕt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
(2.12)
6
βRtEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ(
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1 (2.13)
Equation (2.12) shows the optimal plan for the consumption and labor
supply for the household. In addition, it also shows the labor supply schedule
in terms of real wages for fixed marginal utility from the consumption. And,
the latter is the Euler equation, where Rt = Et
{(
1
Qt,t+1
)}
is the gross nom-
inal return on a one-period riskless bond. Equation (2.13) can be interpreted
as the ratio of utility loss by buying an Arrow security to discounted utility
gain from expected consumption in next period is equal to the gross nominal
return.
Now, let’s write the optimality conditions in log-linearized form:
ϕnt + σct = wt − pt (2.14)
ct = Etct+1 − 1
σ
(it − Et{pit+1} − ρ) (2.15)
where pit = pt − pt−1 is the CPI inflation (with pt = logPt), ρ = −logβ is the
time discount rate, and it = −logQt,t+1 is the nominal interest rate.
In the rest of the world, a representative agent faces the symmetric prob-
lem and optimality conditions are symmetric to our small open economy.
However, since we assumed the continuum of economies, the rest of the world
can be seen as a closed economy because our small economy is negligible
according to the rest of the world.
Now, define terms of trade as St =
PF,t
PH,t
=
(
1∫
0
S1−γi,t di
) 1
1−γ
where Si,t =
Pi,t
PH,t
, and in log-linearized form, st = pF,t − pH,t (the price of foreign goods in
terms of home goods). So, after we log-linearize the CPI formula, we obtain:
pt = (1− α)pH,t + αpF,t
= pH,t + αst. (2.16)
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Then, we can write the relationship between domestic inflation and CPI-
inflation:
pit = piH,t + α∆st (2.17)
Equation (2.17) states that a household in the domestic economy will face
with a CPI inflation rate that is influenced by the change of prices in the
foreign world, and this influence is augmented as the economy becomes more
open.
We do also assume that law-of-one price holds for both import and export
prices, which implies Pi,t(j) = ξtP
∗
i,t(j) for all i, j ∈ [0, 1] where P ∗i,t(j) denotes
the price of good j produced in country i in the currency of country i, and
therefore ξt is the nominal exchange rate. Here, it is useful to note that
the goods that are imported from the rest of the world are not domestically
produced.
If we aggregate the previous equation over goods and over all foreign
countries, we obtain PF,t = ξtP
∗
F,t. Then, combine the log-linearized version
of this condition with the terms of trade condition, we obtain the terms of
trade condition in terms of nominal exchange rate and foreign good’s price in
foreign currency:
st = et + p
∗
F,t − pH,t (2.18)
Here et = logξt. Since our small economy is negligible according to rest
of the world, we can write p∗F,t = p
∗
t .
2.1.1 International Risk Sharing
With the assumption of domestic and international complete financial mar-
kets, we can write the Euler equation of a foreign country as a symmetric
case of our small open economy’s. Then dividing two symmetric equations
leads to:
Ct = κC∗t Ω
1/σ
t (2.19)
8
where κ is a constant that depends on initial conditions on relative asset
holdings, and Ωt =
ξtP ∗t
Pt
is the real exchange rate. By the assumption of zero
net foreign asset holding, and identical environments, κ = 1.
It is useful to notice here that while the law of one price holds for each in-
dividual good, real exchange rate may still fluctuate between different periods
due to differences between domestic and world consumption baskets. But, in
the symmetric perfect foresight steady state, with the help of symmetry of
the productivity levels among all countries, we have Ωt = St = 1, and this
implies that purchasing power parity holds at the steady state.
After log-linearizing the equation (2.19) around zero, we obtain the inter-
national risk sharing condition which shows us the linkage between the home
consumption and consumption in foreign countries and the terms of trade
condition via complete financial markets:
ct = c
∗
t +
(1− α)
σ
st (2.20)
Thus, a country whose real exchange rate depreciates will experience faster
consumption growth than the rest of the world, and as domestic country
becomes more open, the gains from real exchange rate depreciation will be
faded.1
This equation has its meaning when there exists an import-export activity
among the countries. However, as economy becomes fully closed (i.e. α→ 0),
due to law of one price assumption and symmetric preferences among coun-
tries it again tells us domestic consumption is equal to foreign consumption.
2.1.2 Uncovered Interest Parity Condition
What we need to do is to combine the pricing equation of a riskless bond in
foreign currency with the domestic bond pricing equation. Namely, R−1t =
1This is consistent with the risk sharing condition that is proposed and tested by Backus
and Smith (1993).
9
Et{Qt,t+1} and, ξtR∗−1t = Et{Qt,t+1ξt+1}. We obtain:
Et
{
Qt,t+1
[
Rt −R∗t
(
ξt+1
ξt
)]}
= 0 (2.21)
After log-linearizing the last equation around steady state, it yields to:
it − i∗t = Et{et+1} − et. (2.22)
And, we can combine the uncovered interest parity condition with the
previous terms of trade equation to show that variations in the terms of trade
are a function of current and anticipated real interest rate differentials:
st = (i
∗
t − Et{pi∗t+1})− (it − Et{piH,t+1}) + Et{st+1} (2.23)
Equation (2.23) shows that a change in terms of trade between two consec-
utive periods is adjusted by the change in difference of the real interest rates
(i.e. a relative increase in prices of imported goods between two consecutive
periods will lead to an increase in terms of trade and in foreign inflation next
period which will balance each other).
Moreover, since PPP requiring to hold at steady state implies that limT→∞
Et{sT} = 0, we can iterate (2.23) to obtain:
st = Et{
∞∑
k=0
[(i∗t+k − pi∗t+k+1)− (it+k − pit+k+1)]} (2.24)
Assumption of PPP holding at steady state implies that the difference
between foreign and home real interest rates will be zero at steady state.
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2.2 Firms
On the supply side of the economy, home economy produces with the following
production technology:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (2.25)
where at = logAt follows an AR(1) process at = ρaat−1 + t.
The aggregate domestic output index will be of the form:
Yt =
[ 1∫
0
Yt(j)
1− 1
εdj
] ε
ε−1
(2.26)
In log-linearized terms, we have
yt = at + nt. (2.27)
In the rest of the world, firms produce goods with the technology a∗t =
ρ∗aa
∗
t−1 + 
∗
t .
Firms set their prices just like in Calvo(1983) with staggered-price mecha-
nism. We assume that θ is the portion of firms that do not change their prices
each period. Optimal price setting strategy for the typical firm resetting its
price in period t is approximated by log-linearization:
p¯H,t = µ+ (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt{mct+k} (2.28)
Here p¯H,t is the new set domestic price, µ = log(
ε
1−ε) is the gross markup
in the steady state, equivalently the equilibrium markup of flexible price econ-
omy, and mct is the real marginal cost. The determination of real marginal
cost in terms of domestic output differs from the one in closed economy due
to the disparity between consumption and output, and between CPI and
domestic prices.
11
mct = ϑ+ wt − pH,t − at (2.29)
= ϑ+ wt − pt + pt − pH,t − at
= ϑ+ σct + ϕnt + αst − at
= ϑ+ σy∗t + ϕyt + st − (1 + ϕ)at
In this context, ϑ = log(1 − τ), and τ is the employment subsidy that
neutralizes the distortion arisen from firms’ market power, and its role will
be important while making monetary policy analysis. The effects of domestic
output and technology are in the same manner with the closed economy case
as they influence the productivity and the employment.2 However, mct is an
increasing function in world output and terms of trade, and they are both
influencing the real wages through the wealth effect.
The price setting mechanism in the rest of the world is in the same manner
as in the small open economy’s. For simplicity, we assume θ∗ = θ which
implies the price changing behavior is the same all over the world.
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Aggregate Demand, Output and Inflation Dy-
namics
First, by aggregating over all countries, the world market clearing condition
will be: y∗t =
1∫
0
yitdi =
1∫
0
citdi = c
∗
t . Since the preferences of representative
household are identical to the one in the small open economy, we can write:
y∗t = Et{y∗t+1} −
1
σ
(i∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − ρ) (2.30)
2See e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
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Goods market clearing in the home country yields to:
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) +
1∫
0
CiH,t(j)di (2.31)
where CiH,t(j) denotes country i’s demand for good j produced in the
home economy.
Inserting the optimal consumption demand equations into the latter and
using the analogous expression for the rest of the world, we get:
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) + C
∗
H,t(j) (2.32)
=
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
κY ∗t
[(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
(1− α)Ω1/σt +
(
PH,t
ξtP ∗t
)
α
]
Since Yt =
[
1∫
0
Yt(j)
1− 1
εdj
] ε
ε−1
, by the use of the previous equation we
obtain:
Yt = κY ∗t S
η
t [(1− α)Ω
1
σ
−η
t + α] (2.33)
First order approximation of this expression will give us
yt = y
∗
t +
1
σα
st (2.34)
where σα =
σ
(1−α)+αω and ω = σγ + (1 − α)(ση − 1). Domestic country
and foreign country balance their production according to their trade levels.
A change in output affects terms of trade which is captured by 1
σα
. It is also
important to note that when σ = γ = η = 1, ω = 1, a boom in aggregate
output of the home country will follow an increase in foreign output and/or
terms of trade due to impact of import-export activity.
In order to see the domestic consumption as a weighted average of domes-
tic and world output for the special case when σ = γ = η = 1, we can use
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the last equation with the international risk sharing equation to get:
ct = (1− α)yt + αy∗t (2.35)
This implies that CPI consumption demand is divided between goods that
are bought from abroad and home product goods depending on the degree of
openness of the country.
Finally, the last two equations combined with the Euler gives us the do-
mestic output in terms of domestic real interest rate and world output:
yt = Et{yt+1} − 1
σα
(it − Et{piH,t+1} − ρ) + α(ω − 1)Et{∆y∗t+1} (2.36)
It is useful to note that any change in domestic real interest rate (it −
Et{piH,t+1}) will affect the output, and the sensitivity between these two will
be higher as degree of openness of the country changes. For given foreign
output, an increase in real rates will lead to a real appreciation which follows
an increase in CPI inflation and a decrease in consumption based real rate
(it − Et{pit+1}), which offsets the effect of the change.
Second, the dynamics of the inflation in the world economy is also char-
acterized by staggered price mechanism Calvo. By combining optimal price
setting decision for world economy with evolution of the aggregate price level
one can find
pi∗t = βEt{pi∗t+1}+ λm˜ct∗ (2.37)
where m˜ct
∗ is the deviation of the marginal cost from its steady state
value and λ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
. The inflation dynamics in the small open economy
is analogous to the rest of the world:
piH,t = βEt{piH,t+1}+ λm˜ct. (2.38)
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2.3.2 A Canonical Representation
One can use the marginal cost equation, which is evaluated at the steady
state, and equation (2.29) to obtain the natural level of output. Then, we
can write the marginal cost in terms of output gap. After using the previous
equations, we obtain the relationship between real marginal cost and the
output gap in GM.3
m˜ct = (σα + ϕ)y˜t (2.39)
Combine this result with inflation dynamics, and we will get the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for the small open economy:
piH,t = βEt{piH,t+1}+ καy˜t (2.40)
where κα = λ(σα +ϕ). And with the help of the Euler, we have the dynamic
IS (DIS) equation:
y˜t = Et{y˜t+1} − 1
σα
(it − Et{piH,t+1} − rrt) (2.41)
where the Wicksellian real rate of interest is
rrt = ρ− σ + (1 + ϕ)(1− ρa)
σ + ϕω
at − ϕσ(1− ω)
σ + φω
Et{∆y∗t+1} (2.42)
GM obtained a NKPC for the open economy very similar to the one in
closed economy as in CGG(2001) and CGG(2002). The degree of openness
of the country affects the inflation dynamics by influencing the variation in
the output gap. In open economy, a change in domestic output has an effect
on marginal cost through employment and terms of trade. In addition, DIS
shows that the openness influences the output gap sensitivity to interest rate
changes, and natural rate depends on expected increase in world output in
3Here, y˜t denotes the deviation of output from potential.
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addition to domestic productivity through openness as previously discussed.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND
ALTERNATIVE LOSS FUNCTIONS
In this section, we derive the optimal monetary policy and discuss the equi-
librium dynamics, first, when both domestic and foreign central banks pursue
the optimal monetary policy, and second, when domestic monetary authority
aims to minimize different welfare rule based loss functions.
Following Rotemberg and Woodford(1999), fiscal authority in the world
economy fully neutralizes the distortions which are caused from firms’ market
power, with a constant employment subsidy, and the optimal monetary pol-
icy replicates the flexible price equilibrium allocation in the world economy
(which is considered as a closed economy). Optimal monetary policy in such
an environment is the one that fully stabilizes the prices and output gap,
that is y˜∗t = pi
∗
t = 0. The interest rate that supports the optimal allocation is
given in equation (2.42). On the other side of the coin, in the open economy,
as discussed by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), there exists another economic
distortion that is a direct result of openness. A country may have an incentive
to affect its terms of trade by influencing the supply of its products. This
statement is a result coming from imperfect elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. If we set σ = γ = η = 1, then there exists a
constant employment subsidy that offsets the distortions coming from market
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power and letting γ = 1 will yield no distortions due to terms of trade. Then,
again the optimal policy becomes the flexible price equilibrium allocation.1
As in the closed economy, the optimal monetary policy requires stabilizing
output gap, y˜t = 0, then equation (2.40) shows that piH,t = 0 holds.
2
3.1 Welfare Analysis and Alternative Loss Func-
tions
After making a second order Taylor approximation to the utility of the rep-
resentative household in the small open economy, as in GM, we find
Wˆt =
(1− α)
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ε
λ
pi2H,t + (1 + ϕ)y˜t
2
]
+ t.i.p.+ o(||a||3). (3.1)
Here, t.i.p. stands for terms independent of policy, and the derivation
of the second order approximation can be seen in Appendix C. Following
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), with
taking unconditional expectations on the latter equation and letting β → 1,
the expected welfare losses obtained from deviating from strict inflation tar-
geting can be written as variances of domestic inflation and output gap.
When β → 1, the sum in equation (3.1) becomes unbounded, and it is
consisted of two components: one corresponding to the deterministic op-
timization problem when all shocks are zero, and the other proportional
to the variances of the shocks. The latter converges when β → 1, be-
cause terms approach zero quickly, and the decision problem becomes well
defined. The intertemporal loss function approaches the infinite sums of
unconditional means of the period loss function, and the scaled loss func-
1In a 2-country open economy setting like in Benigno and Benigno (2003), it is enough
to set σ = η = 1. However, while considering multiple foreign countries, we must consider
setting the substitutability between goods produced in different foreign countries to 1, i.e.
γ = 1.
2Derivation of this constant employment subsidy for both economies is shown in Ap-
pendix D.
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tion, (1−β)∑∞t=0 βt[1−α2 ( ελpi2H,t+(1+ϕ)y2t)], approaches the unconditional
mean:3
E[Lt] =
1− α
2
[
ε
λ
V ar[piH,t] + (1 + ϕ)V ar[y˜t]
]
. (3.2)
So, we can interpret the intertemporal loss function as the unconditional
mean of the period loss function, and now we recommend reasonable and
simple alternative loss functions to the one derived from the second order ap-
proximation. The alternatives are the one which is considering only stabiliza-
tion of domestic inflation, the one that admires to minimize the loss coming
from CPI-inflation and output variations, domestic inflation and exchange
rate variability, and lastly, the loss function that wishes to minimize the loss
due to variations in CPI inflation and exchange rate variability. Namely,
L´1t = V ar[piH,t] (3.3)
L´2t = V ar[pit] + V ar[y˜t] (3.4)
L´3t = V ar[piH,t] + V ar[et] (3.5)
L´4t = V ar[pit] + V ar[et]. (3.6)
Here, one should note that the measure that we use while we are comparing
these loss functions is equation (3.2). Monetary policy authority considers the
alternative loss functions that are stated in (3.3)-(3.6), and for each policy
we calculate the losses according to equation (3.2), which gives us the true
welfare losses when alternative policies are applied.
3.2 Calibration and Impulse Responses
We follow the same calibration as in GM. We set σ = η = γ = 1, ϕ = 3, where
the latter implies that elasticity of labor is 1/3. The value of the steady state
ratio of the prices to the marginal cost, mark-up, µ = 1.2, and elasticity of
3One can check Woodford(2003, Chapter 6) for a more detailed discussion.
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substitution between goods, ε = 6. The probability of firms that reset their
prices to 0.25, namely θ = 0.75. And, β = 0.99. Finally, we set ρ∗a = ρa = 0.9,
and the correlation between the domestic and world shocks is 0.77.
The impulse responses after a positive domestic technology shock while
we are applying the fully optimal policy is shown in Figure 3 (for the case
α = 0.40). Figure 3 also represents the impulse responses when monetary
authority considers equation (3.3) in order to minimize only the variation in
domestic inflation. As we discussed above, a domestic inflation targeting will
yield to piH,t = 0. This in turn will make y˜t = 0, through equation (2.40),
and optimal policy coincides with first alternative irrespective to the degree
of openness parameter. We can say that, for every degree of openness param-
eter, concerning only domestic inflation will give us the same results with the
optimal monetary policy. Besides, we observe that after a technology innova-
tion, domestic nominal interest rate falls in order to support the increase in
consumption and output. In addition, uncovered interest parity implies that
a fall in the interest rate of the open economy will be adjusted by a relative
increase in the next period’s terms of trade and domestic currency will depre-
ciate against foreign currency, given the constant world interest rate, which
will yield to an increase in CPI inflation.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses after a technological innovation while
the central bank is applying second alternative (equation (3.4)). Here, we
fixed the degree of openness parameter, α to 0.40. When the central bank is
concerning about stabilizing the summation of variances in CPI inflation and
output gap, a positive shock leads to an increase in CPI inflation which is the
result of depreciating exchange rates due to an increase in output. In this case,
real exchange rate reaction is lessened by considering CPI inflation rather than
domestic inflation, which yielded hump shaped graphs for exchange rates.
Impulse response graphs for a positive production shock when the central
bank concerns to minimize the variations in exchange rate and domestic in-
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flation are shown in Figure 5. Relative to second alternative, deviations in
output gap and domestic inflation increase but they follow a pattern in the
same manner. Since output gap is not concerned by the central bank, a higher
deviation takes place. And, in order to support the expansion in production,
exchange rates depreciate, which in turn yields a decrease in open economy’s
interest rate (again, for given constant world interest rate).
Lastly, in Figure 6, we obtain similar impulse responses for the fourth
alternative according to third alternative. The main difference is the less
depreciation of nominal exchange rate with respect to the one for alternative
three. The reason is that the central bank is concerned about CPI inflation in
alternative four instead of domestic inflation as in alternative three. However,
we see a similar pattern for the real exchange rates. Nominal interest rate has
a smaller decrease than the one in impulse response functions of alternative
three, due to less nominal exchange rate variation.
These impulse response graphs show similar reactions oppositely but sym-
metrically when a shock comes from foreign world, rather than the home
country.
3.3 Welfare Losses
In this part, we calculate the welfare losses of each policy while the degree
of openness in the economy is increasing, and make a comparison with the
ad-hoc alternative policies. As can be seen from the Table 1, and as we men-
tioned before, first alternative policy coincides with optimal monetary policy
according to welfare losses. Stabilizing the domestic inflation stabilizes the
output gap through NKPC irrespective of the degree of openness. Among the
other alternatives, it is clearly seen that second alternative policy dominates
third and fourth alternative policies. The fall in CPI inflation, with respect
to optimal and first alternative case, requires a contractionary monetary pol-
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icy. In addition, as economy becomes closed, concerning CPI inflation implies
concerning domestic inflation. Thus, we see losses close to zero as degree of
openness is getting smaller. On the other hand, as economy becomes more
open, taking CPI inflation in consideration becomes important.
It is also seen that third alternative policy dominates the fourth policy,
while these policies are giving relatively higher losses according to other al-
ternatives. Concerning exchange rate volatility yields to a higher volatility
in domestic inflation rather than other alternatives. As economy becomes
closed, the optimal loss function penalizes more for including exchange rates
in consideration. Lastly, it is observable that not considering output stabi-
lization in the policy gives higher losses for each degree of openness value.
In order to quantify the effects of considering output gap and exchange
rate next to CPI inflation in the alternative loss functions two and four, we
can modify them as
˘´
L2t = ψV ar[pit] + (1− ψ)V ar[y˜t] (3.7)
˘´
L4t = ςV ar[pit] + (1− ς)V ar[et].
where ς, ψ ∈ (0, 1) and determines the weight on each variable. The results
obtained by varying ς and ψ are in Table 2 and Table 3 (for constant α =
0.40). It is clearly seen that increasing the incentive to stabilize the variation
in CPI inflation increases the losses obtained from second alternative, on the
contrary, as ψ → 0 losses converge to zero due to the property of the optimal
monetary policy. In alternative four, since we did not include the output gap
and domestic inflation in the loss function, giving more weight to stabilizing
exchange rate variability yields more losses and concerning with only CPI
inflation has fewer losses than those obtained from the alternatives three and
four.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
This master’s thesis compared ad-hoc but reasonable and simple alternative
loss functions as rising alternative monetary policies to the optimal monetary
policy while the degree of openness in a country is increasing by using the
small open economy model that is presented in GM.
The welfare cost of alternative policies is calculated by using the fully
optimal policy as a benchmark. It is found that considering the minimization
of domestic inflation variances coincides with the optimal rule. Due to the
structure of the NKPC, considering output gap variation in monetary policy
leads to fewer losses according to consideration of other variables. It is also
observed that taking minimization of variance of nominal exchange rate in
consideration yields higher welfare losses for any given policy.
There are several examples from the previous literature that supports
this result. In addition to the ones that are discussed in introduction, Ko¨sem
Alp(2009) analyzed the relevance of sectoral inflation persistence differences
with optimal monetary policy using a two-sector sticky price model, and
found that optimal inflation targeting rather than CPI inflation targeting
reduces the welfare losses. It can be interpreted as an analysis of the optimal
monetary policy under a currency union with heterogeneous regions, and
concerning about optimal rule rather than CPI targeting rises as another
23
support to this paper.
A further interesting extension to this paper would be considering incom-
plete markets to fill the gap in the literature. Considering incomplete markets
assumption with monetary policy can yield closer results for emerging coun-
tries. Finally, one might quantify the benefits gained from monetary policy
coordination under incomplete markets as a further research on this paper.
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APPENDIX A
Figure 4.1: Ratio of Imports plus Exports to GDP (Turkey)
28
Figure 4.2: Ratio of Imports plus Exports to GDP (USA)
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Productivity Shock
under the Optimal Policy and Alternative 1
30
Figure 4.4: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Productivity Shock
under the Alternative Policy 2
31
Figure 4.5: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Productivity Shock
under the Alternative Policy 3
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Figure 4.6: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Productivity Shock
under the Alternative Policy 4
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APPENDIX B
Table 4.1: Welfare Losses According to Each Policy
α 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Optimal Policy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alternative 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alternative 2 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.28 0.17
Alternative 3 5.06 4.50 3.94 3.37 2.81 2.25 1.68 1.12 0.56
Alternative 4 5.27 4.88 4.45 3.97 3.44 2.85 2.22 1.53 0.79
Table 4.2: Welfare Losses While Changing the Weight on CPI In-
flation and Output Gap
ψ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Alternative 2 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.39 0.57 0.82 1.12
Table 4.3: Welfare Losses While Changing the Weight on CPI In-
flation and Nominal Exchange Rate
ς 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Alternative 4 4.81 4.65 4.47 4.24 3.97 3.62 3.19 2.65 2.02
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APPENDIX C
As discussed in the main text, the derivation of the welfare loss function is
done for the case where γ = η = σ = 1.
Yt − Y
Y
= yt +
1
2
y2t + o(||a||3) (4.1)
where o(||a||3) represents the terms that are in higher order than 3rd. Now
the utility consumption,
logCt = c¯t + c˜t = c¯t + (1− α)y˜t (4.2)
where c¯t is the potential consumption level, and the latter is written by using
equation (2.34).
Now, approximate the disutility gained from labor,
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
=
N¯t
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ N¯t
1+ϕ
[
n˜t +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)n˜t
2
]
+ o(||a||3) (4.3)
Since, Nt = (
Yt
At
)
1∫
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−εdj we have,
n˜t = y˜t + log
1∫
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−εdj (4.4)
Now, define p¯H,t(j) = pH,t(j) − pH,t. We also have
1∫
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)1−εdj = 1.
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Now,
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)1−ε = exp[(1− ε)p¯H,t(j)] (4.5)
= 1 + (1− ε)p¯H,t(j) + (1− ε)
2
2
p¯H,t(j)
2 + o(||a||3).
A second approximation to (
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε yields,
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε = 1− εp¯H,t(j) + ε
2
2
p¯H,t(j)
2 + o(||a||3) (4.6)
Here, combining the results give us,
1∫
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−εdj = 1 +
ε
2
E{p¯H,t(j)2} (4.7)
= 1 +
ε
2
V ar{p¯H,t(j)}
Then, it follows that,
log
1∫
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−εdj =
ε
2
V ar{p¯H,t(j)}+ o(||a||3) (4.8)
Now, we can write the disutility from labor as,
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
=
N¯1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
+ N¯1+ϕt [
¯
y˜t +
ε
2
V ar{p¯H,t(j)}+ 1
2
(1 + ϕ)y˜t
2] + o(||a||3).(4.9)
Insert the optimality condition that N¯t
1+ϕ
= (1−α) to convert the utility
function into,
−(1− α)[ε
2
V ar{p¯H,t(j)}+ 1
2
(1 + ϕ)y˜t
2] + o(||a||3). (4.10)
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Lemma 1.
∑∞
t=0 β
tV ar{p¯H,t(j)} = 1λ
∑∞
t=0 β
tpi2H,t, where λ =
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
.
Proof. Woodford (2003, Chapter 6).
Combining the above lemma with the previous result gives us the second
order approximation to the small open economy’s household’s utility function:
Wˆt = −(1− α)
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ε
λ
pi2H,t + (1 + ϕ)y˜
2
t
]
+ t.i.p.+ o(||a||3). (4.11)
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APPENDIX D
In order to find the employment subsidy that is considered by the world
economy, first, in order to find optimal allocation, one should maximize
U(C∗t , N
∗
t ) =
(C∗t )1−σ
1−σ − (N
∗
t )
1+ϕ
1+ϕ
subject to C∗t = A
∗
tN
∗
t , for all t. First or-
der condition is given by, −N∗ϕt = C∗−σt A∗t .
Whereas, the flexible price equilibrium satisfies
1− 1
ε
= ¯MC∗t (4.12)
=
(1− τ ∗)
A∗t
−N∗ϕt
C∗−σt
.
Then, setting τ ∗ = 1
ε
will tell us that world policymaker fully stabilizes the
distortions that are risen by market power. Thus, optimal monetary policy
in such an environment is the one that obtains y˜∗t = pi
∗
t = 0.
On the other hand, in the small open economy maximization of U(Ct, Nt) =
(Ct)1−σ
1−σ − (Nt)
1+ϕ
1+ϕ
will be subject to two more constraints. Namely, the risk shar-
ing condition in equation (2.19) and implicitly defined relationship between
terms of trade, and domestic and foreign output in equation (2.34). In order
to solve this problem, we set η = σ = 1, and we obtain the consumption
demand of home country as Ct = Y
1−α
t Y
∗α
t . Then first order condition to
maximization problem yields −N1+ϕt = (1− α)C1−σt .
Whereas, the flexible equilibrium satisfies
1− 1
ε
= M¯Ct (4.13)
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=
(1− τ)
At
(
Yt
Y ∗t
)−α−N∗ϕt
C∗−σt
= (1− τ)(1− α).
Hence, setting (1−τ)(1−α) = 1− 1
ε
, will lead to the small open economy’s
optimality of flexible price equilibrium. Which in turn, the optimal monetary
policy in small open economy is the one that requires fully stabilizing the
output gap and domestic inflation (i.e. y˜t = piH,t = 0).
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